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NOTES
opportunity to act in a way that would have prevented the plaintiff's injuries.
Such a showing will be more difficult to maintain the further removed in
time and space the plaintiff is from the defendant's establishment.
Linton W. Carney
NONPECUNIARY DAMAGES IN BREACH OF CONTRACT: LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
ARTICLE 1934
An action for breach of contract was brought against an automobile
repairman who had unnecessarily delayed completion of repairs for five
months. In addition to direct pecuniary loss, plaintiff sought damages for
aggravation, distress, and inconvenience under Louisiana Civil Code article
1934(3).' The Louisiana Supreme Court held that plaintiff could not
recover for the nonpecuniary damages because article 1934(3) contemplates
only contracts a principal object of which is intellectual enjoyment notwith-
standing other peripheral, incidental, or concurrent objects of physical
gratification. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So.2d 433 (La.
1976).
2Article 1934 governs damages recoverable for breach of contract.
Excepting contracts having as an object the payment of money, the general
rule is that damages due are the amount of the loss sustained and profit
deprived.3 The first two modifications of this rule affect the quantum or
I. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1934 provides inter alia: "Where the object of the
contract is any thing but the payment of money, the damages due to the creditor for its
breach are the amount of the loss he has sustained, and the profit of which he has been
deprived, under the following exceptions and modifications:
i. When the debtor has been guilty of no fraud or bad faith, he is liable only
for such damages as were contemplated, or may reasonably be supposed to have
entered into the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract. By bad faith
in this and the next rule, is not meant the mere breach of faith in not complying with
the contract, but a designed breach of it from some motive of interest or ill will.
2. When the inexecution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or bad faith,
the debtor shall not only be liable to such damages as were, or might have been
foreseen at the time of making the contract, but also to such as are the immediate and
direct consequence of the breach of that contract; but even when there is fraud, the
damages can not exceed this.
3. Although the general rule is, that damages are the amount of the loss the
creditor has sustained, or of the gain of which he has been deprived, yet there are
cases in which damages may be assessed without calculating altogether on the
1977]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
amount of damages recoverable. In the absence of fraud or bad faith,
recovery is limited to forseeable damages,4 whereas a breach proceeding
from fraud or bad faith requires reparation of all damages of direct and
immediate consequence of the breach. 5 The third modification of the
general rule provides for the assessment of damages not calculated al-
together on pecuniary loss or deprivation of pecuniary gain, and specifically
allows recovery for the breach of contracts having the "gratification of
some intellectual enjoyment" as their object.6 Such objects are illustratively
characterized by those founded in "religion, morality or taste, or some
convenience or other gratification." 7
Where Louisiana courts have denied recovery for nonpecuniary dam-
ages, there has been an expressed emphasis of the general rule that only the
amount of pecuniary loss is recoverable with either no mention of article
1934(3) or perfunctory dismissal of its applicability. 8 Recovery has been
allowed for nonpecuniary damages when the breach was willful and
pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary gain to the party. Where the contract has
for its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion,
morality or taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification, although these are
not appreciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due for their breach; a
contract for a religious or charitable foundation, a promise of marriage, or an
engagement for a work of some of the fine arts, are objects and examples of this rule.
2. Nominate contracts treated by the Civil Code refer obliquely to article 1934
by alluding to "damages," "loss," or "penalty." See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts.
2506(4) (eviction from thing sold), 2695 (lease), 2765 (letting out of labor), 2898 (loan),
3002 (power of attorney), 3075 (compromise), 3365 (mortgage).
3. Id. art. 1934 (first paragraph). See note I, supra.
4. Id. art. 1934(1). See note I, supra.
5. Id. art. 1934(2). See note 1, supra.
6. Id. art. 1934(3). See note 1, supra. The source of this modification has been
attributed to TOULLIER, 6 DROIT CIVIL, Liv. III, Tit. III, Chap. III, Sec. IV, § III,
n.293 (305 seq.)(1821) and DOMAT, I LoIxCIVILES, Part. I, Liv. III,Tit. V, Sec. II, ns.
XI, XII (270) (1777). Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Projet of 1823: A
General Analytical Survey, 47 TUL. L. REv. 1, 80 (1972). For a discussion of the
contribution of Domat see Comment, Damages ex contractu: Recovery of Non-
pecuniary Damages for Breach of Contract Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934,
48 TUL. L. REV. 1160, 1173-74 (1974).
7. Id. art. 1934(3). See note 1, supra.
8. See McNeill v. Elchinger, 231 La. 1090, 93 So. 2d 669 (1957) (breach of
community property settlement, holding "no law making such a claim cognizable");
Tauzin v. Sam Broussard Plymouth, Inc., 283 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973)
(misrepresentation of car as new in sale, holding "no such showing here" that the
contract falls within the exception of article 1934); Moreau v. Marler Ford Co., 282
So. 2d 852 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) (delay in delivery of new truck, holding "not
fall[ing] within the exception" of article 1934).
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amounted to an independent tort9 or the contract was one strongly coupled
with matters of personal sensibilities or family interests unquestionably
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract,' 0
including contracts the breach of which results in foreseeable serious bodily
harm or death to a close relation. "
For example, where the party breaching was apprised that the property
to be sold, leased or constructed was to be used for a home, the transaction
has been characterized as more than a mere business transaction for
investment or pecuniary gain; and since a home is especially suited to
personal and family taste and convenience, damages have been awarded for
disappointment, discomfort, and inconvenience caused by the breach. 2 In
9. See Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Inc., 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945)
(cripple not admitted to theatre after purchasing ticket); O'Meallie v. Moreau, 116
La. 1020, 41 So. 243 (1906) (breach of contract to provide picnic area; article 1934 not
mentioned); Enders v. Skannal, 35 La. Ann. 1000 (1883) (workers at sawmill on
defendant's land driven off by threats and violence).
10. See Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903)
(failure to promptly deliver telegram announcing serious illness and approaching
death); Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903) (contract to provide wedding
trousseau); Grather v. Tipery Studios, Inc., 334 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976)
(photography at wedding unprofessionally performed); Mitchell v. Shreveport Laun-
dries, Inc., 221 La. 686, 61 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952) (suit of clothes to be
cleaned for wedding); Garner v. Burnstein, I La. App. 19 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1924)
(milliner failed to provide hat but no recovery because defendant not advised of the
special purpose for which the hat was intended). See also Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l
Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973) (recovery denied for breach of health
and accident contract by insurer because no evidence to show purpose was peace of
mind).
i1. See Jiles v. Venus Community Center Benevolent Mut. Aid Ass'n, 191 La.
803, 186 So. 342 (1939) (contract to provide doctor's services and medicines); Holland
v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1961) (child ate poison
set out by defendant who had a contract to control pests in plaintiff's home).
12. See Arquembourg v. Bourque, 243 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 257 La. 989, 244 So. 2d 859 (La. 1971) (delay in delivery of home causing
considerable inconvenience); Jack v. Henry, 128 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961)
(construction of home with defects); Meyer v. Succession of McClellan, 30 So. 2d
788 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1947) (lessor deprived of property for use as residence after
lessee breached contract); Melson v. Woodruff, 23 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945)
(broker sold home after contract with plaintiff who had sold his own home in
reliance). See also Nickens v. McGehee, 184 So. 2d 271 (La. App. ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 249 La. 199, 186 So. 2d 159 (966) (mental anguish for damage to personal
property of lessee due to defective conditions of leased residence). Contracts of
alteration or restoration of buildings used as homes have not admitted recovery. See
Sahuc v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 320 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1963) (faulty
installation of hot water heater caused house to burn); Baker v. Stamps, 82 So. 2d 858
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955) (restoration of bathroom); Lillis v. Anderson, 21 So. 2d 389
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945) (repair of dilapidated home).
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short, the courts have, without specific treatment of the language of article
1934(3), permitted recovery of nonpecuniary damages where the plaintiff's
primary motive for entering the contract was not pecuniary or economic but
fostering or protecting personal and family interests including feelings,
sensibilities, taste, and convenience.' 3
In the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted initially that the
nonpecuniary damages sought by the plaintiff were in fact suffered and that
the amount of the lower court's award was "reasonable and proper." 1 4
Considering the recoverability of these damages under article 1934(3), the
court acquiesced in the position taken by both the plaintiff and defendant
that "intellectual" gratification can be substantively distinguished from
"physical" gratification under article 1934(3) and classified prior jurispru-
dence as "strict," "broad," or "liberal" with respect to the treatment of
this distinction.15 Regarding these classifications of prior jurisprudence as
indicative of the ambiguity of article 1934(3), the court considered the 1825
French version of this article' 6 and found the correct translation to be in part:
When the contract has for its object to confer to someone a purely
intellectual enjoyment, such as those pertaining to religion, morality,
taste, convenience or other gratifications of this sort . 1. 7
13. This treatment by the courts of nonpecuniary damages under article 1934(3)
is substantially in agreement with the common law. See 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1076 at 425 (1963); 38 AM. JUR. 2d Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturb-
ance § 33 (1968); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 245 (1965); Annot., 61 A.L.R. 3d 922
(1975). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1932): "In actions for breach of
contract, damages will not be given as compensation for mental suffering, except
where the breach was wanton or reckless and caused bodily harm and where it was
the wanton or reckless breach of a contract to render a performance of such a
character that the defendant had reason to know when the contract was made that the
breach would cause mental suffering for reasons other than mere pecuniary loss."
14. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 434 (La. 1976).
15. Id. at 435. The "strict" interpretation of article 1934(3) permits non-
pecuniary recovery when the object of the contract contains only elements of
intellectual gratification; the "broad" interpretation allows nonpecuniary recovery
when both physical and intellectual gratification are present; and the "liberal"
interpretation provides nonpecuniary recovery even though only elements of physi-
cal gratification are found in the contractual object. For the source of this substantive
position on the interpretation of article 1934(3) see Comment, Damages ex contractu:
Recovery of Nonpecuniary Damages for Breach of Contract Under Louisiana Civil
Code Article 1934, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1160 (1974), cited in 332 So. 2d at 435 n.5. See also
note 42, infra.
16. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1928(3) (1825) provides inter alia: "Lorsque le contract A
pour but de procurer A quelqu'un une jouissance purement intellectuelle, telle que
celles qui tiennent A la religion, la morale, au got, k la commodit6 ou A toute autre
espice de satisfaction de ce genre ....
17. 322 So. 2d at 436.
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Contrasting the foregoing with the "mistranslation" of this article in the
English version of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 which was repeated in
Civil Code of 1870:18
Where the contract has for its object the gratification of some intellec-
tual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality, or taste, or some
convenience or other legal gratification ..... 19
the court concluded that the clause should be read as follows:
Where the contract has for its object the gratification of intellectual
enjoyment, such as that pertaining to religion, or morality, or taste, or
convenience .... 20
By this translation, the court removed what it recognized as the source of the
ambiguity of article 1934(3): the asymmetrical qualification of "intellectual
enjoyment" by "religion," "morality," "taste," and "convenience,"
contributed to the possibility that the phrase "or some convenience" could
be regarded disjunctively. Hence a contract could have as its object "some
convenience" and a breach would permit nonpecuniary recovery, thereby
allowing recovery for breach of a contract the object of which is exclusively
physical gratification. 2 1
Regarding the above analysis of the French version as "at least
persuasive," the court promulgated its interpretation of article 1934(3):
where a principal or exclusive object of a contract is intellectual enjoyment,
nonpecuniary damages resulting from its breach are recoverable, notwith-
standing that a "peripheral, or incidental, or even perhaps concurrent"
object of the contract may be physical gratification. 22 Applying this in-
terpretation to the instant fact situation, the court concluded that the plaintiff
could not recover nonpecuniary damages since the principal object 23 was the
repair of plaintiff's automobile with its consequent "utility or physical
gratification.' '24
The court's interpretation of article 1934(3) is founded on the unstated
18. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934(3).
19. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1928(3) (1825) (Emphasis added).
20. 322 So. 2d at 437 (Emphasis added).
21. Id. at 436 n.9, 437.
22. Id. at 437.
23. The definition used by the court for the principal object of a contract was
"the overriding concern of plaintiff evident to defendant at the time the contract was
entered into." Id. Since the court found the plaintiff's concern was the repair of the
car, the court was apparently using "object" in the technical, legal sense. Id. See
generally the text at note 31, infra.
24. d.
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assumption that the article substantively differentiates between intellectual
and physical gratification.25 The court regarded "convenience" as exclu-
sively physical gratification when viewed independently of the phrase
"intellectual enjoyment," but found that "convenience" becomes an
example of the intendment of that phrase when used to qualify it.26
In the construction of laws, words are to be given their usual meaning
according to their general and popular use.27 "Convenience" popularly
means advantage, commodity, personal comfort, or saving of trouble, and
refers to a state or condition of matters.2 8 While experienced through the
physical senses, convenience means the associated intellectual apprecia-
tion. Equating convenience with physical gratification results in a confusion
of the physical object productive of the convenient state with the convenient
state itself.29 The latter meaning is used in article 1934(3), and it is therefore
immaterial whether or not "convenience" is taken as a qualification of
"intellectual enjoyment" since the resulting ambiguity is merely structural
and not substantive.
I Another source of considerable conceptual difficulty in the interpreta-
tion of article 1934(3) is contained in a portion of the French version of that
article not addressed by the court. In the phrase,
[w]here the contract has for its object the gratification of some
intellectual enjoyment,3 °
the source for "object" in the corresponding French version3 l is the French
word but instead of objet. Objet is used throughout the French version of
the Louisiana Civil Code to refer to the object of a contract in its legal
25. See the text at note 15, supra.
26. 332 So. 2d at 437. No reason is given by the court for this metamorphosis of
meaning under a mere change of grammatical structure.
27. LA. CIv. CODE art. 14.
28. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 934 (1970). The French source for "con-
venience" is commoditi, which stresses the idea of personal comfort. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 1928 (1825). See note 16, supra; HARRAP'S NEW STANDARD FRENCH-ENGLISH
DICTIONARY C-69 (1972).
29. The automobile provides a good example of this distinction. An automobile
in a given instance may provide physical gratification, but it is the ongoing use of the
auto that, in the context of American society, denominates the auto as a convenience
amounting to a social necessity. Deprivation of one's personal auto for a long period
of time is usually productive of considerable inconvenience to occupational, social,
and personal life.
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1934(3) (Emphasis added).
31. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1928(3) (1825): "Lorsque le contract A pour but de
procurer quelqu'un une jouissance purement intellectuelle ....... (Emphasis
added).
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sense.32 But does not mean object in the technical, legal sense; rather it
means object in its usual signification as end, purpose, or motive.33 In the
technical sense "object" is the performance required of the debtor and is
pecuniary, 34 and hence is inappropriate as used in article 1934(3) to refer to
intellectual or physical gratification. On the other hand, object in the sense
of motive or purpose is appropriate. The most foreseeable consequence of a
breach of a contract, whatever its object in the technical sense, is that the
purpose or motive of the creditor in entering the contract will be defeated. 
35
If the procurement of intellectual enjoyment, illustratively charac-
terized in the broad and diverse fashion of article 1934(3),36 is a sufficient
motive for entering into a contract the breach of which permits recovery for
nonpecuniary damage, the question naturally arises as to which motives or
purposes are excluded from this exception to the general rule allowing only
pecuniary recovery. The answer can be found in the structure and function
of the article taken as a whole. The first paragraph of article 1934 and its first
two modifications provide the foundation for the recovery of both pecuniary
loss and privation of pecuniary gain. Contracts requiring such reparation
would have a pecuniary motive or purpose. Article 1934(3) in contradistinc-
tion protects contracts with certain nonpecuniary purposes worthy of
protection.37 This approach gives the proper interpretation of article 1934(3)
32. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1877 et seq. (1825) which correspond to LA. CIv.
CODE arts. 1883 et seq.
33. HARRAP'S NEW STANDARD FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY B-51 (1972).
34. IV AUBRY & RAU, COURS DE DRoIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 344 (6th ed. Bartin) in I
CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 327 (1965); 1 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS §§ 26-27, 41 in 6
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 45-46, 57 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1 LITVINOFF].
35. In requiring that the purpose of the obligation rather than the damage
consequential to its breach be foreseeable, article 1934(3) requires a close connection
between the obligation assumed and the nonpecuniary purpose or motive. For
example, mental anguish consequential to property damage unrelated to the purpose
of the obligation assumed should not be compensated. See, e.g., Sahuc v. United
States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 320 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1963) (no recovery for mental
anguish for faulty installation of hot water heater causing house to burn). Where the
specific obligation assumed relates to the protection of another's personal property
as in a contract of deposit or lease, recovery should be granted. See, e.g., Nickens v.
McGehee, 184 So. 2d 271 (La. App. I st Cir.), cert. denied, 249 La. 199, 186 So. 2d 159
(1966); Foster v. Abney, 127 So. 435 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930); see also Nacol v. Wail,
Inc., 219 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 253 La. 1094, 221 So. 2d 521
(1969) (recovery for damage to commercial property on leased premises). Justice
Dixon's dissenting opinion in the instant case suggests awarding nonpecuniary
damage for any property damage sustained, a suggestion which should be qualified in
light of the foregoing. 332 So. 2d at 438-39.
36. See the text at note 7, supra.
37. See I LITVINOFF § 41 at 57.
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for contracts which provide convenience to the creditor. Neither conveni-
ence born of pecuniary advantage nor incidental personal comfort or
convenience provided by a contract entered into for a primary economic
purpose is protected.
The principle of article 1934(3) can be restated in terms of the broad,
illustrative nonpecuniary purposes as follows:
where the purpose or motive of the contract is primarily for personal,
social, or family interests including comfort and convenience and is
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract,
recovery for nonpecuniary damages will be given; however, where the
purpose of the contract is primarily commercial, economic, or other-
wise based on a pecuniary motive, recovery will not be given for
nonpecuniary damages.
The essential difference between the court's interpretation of article 1934(3)
in the instant case 38 and that posited by the foregoing analysis is that the
former treats contracts having objects primarily of intellectual gratification
differently from those having objects primarily of physical gratification,
while the latter interpretation distinguishes contracts entered into for
primarily pecuniary purposes from those entered into for motives which
involve significant personal or family interests or other nonpecuniary
purposes.
The psychological distinction between physical and intellectual gratifi-
cation offered by the court is difficult to apply, as illustrated by two prior
Supreme Court cases cited approvingly in Meador. In Jiles v. Venus
Community Center Benevolent Mutual Aid Association,3 9 an award was
made for mental anguish caused by the death of a child associated with the
breach of a contract to provide doctor's services and medicine. In O'Meallie
v. Moreau,' damages for the vexation to a social group were awarded for
the breach of a contract to provide a picnic area. In declaring these cases
''not at variance" 4 with the instant couit's interpretation of article 1934(3),
the court's reasoning compels the conclusion that the contracts involved in
these cases had principal objects of intellectual gratification rather than
physical gratification, a conclusion not altogether obvious. Considerable
ambiguity and confusion results from imposing the distinction between
physical and intellectual gratification as the object of the contract upon prior
38. See the text at note 22, supra.
39. 191 La. 803, 186 So. 342 (1939).
40. 116 La. 1020, 41 So. 243 (1906).
41. 332 So. 2d at 437.
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decisions of the appellate courts applying article 1934(3).42 A complete
absence of language in any of these decisions indicating that the distinction
between physical and intellectual gratification was a factor in the decision is
symptomatic of the inappropriateness of this distinction. However, these
decisions can be easily harmonized with the broad principle of article
1934(3) that in the absence of an overriding pecuniary motive, certain
nonpecuniary purposes will be protected.43
The adoption of the principle of article 1934(3) as developed in the
foregoing analysis is not a complete guide to the application of this article. A
finding of whether the motive of the contract was pecuniary or nonpecuniary
is required, as well as a decision that the nonpecuniary motive or purpose is
significant enough to require protection. 44 This kind of policy determination
42. An exhaustive attempt to interpret prior decisions of the courts in terms of
the distinction between physical and intellectual gratification found in contractual
objects was undertaken by the commentator who originated this distinction. After
concluding that "much of the jurisprudence is inconsistent and irreconcilable," that
commentator questioned the integrity of the language of article 1934(3) rather than
the integrity of the distinction. See Comment, Damages ex contractu: Recovery of
Nonpecuniary Damages for Breach of Contract Under Louisiana Civil Code Article
1934, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1160, 1169 (1974).
43. See the text at note 13, supra. Some cases state this principle expressly. In
Jack v. Henry, 128 So. 2d 62 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1961), a home was constructed with
many defects, and, in awarding damages for general inconvenience and annoyance,
the court said: "[I]t is clear [that] plaintiff herein was aware defendant desired the
residence which is the subject matter of this controversy for occupancy as a home
. . . not as an investment or for pecuniary gain or profit. It is equally certain [that]
defendant planned the home in question to suit his individual needs and tastes
... . - Id. at 72. See also Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d 37 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1973) (health and accident insurance contract had payment of money [a
pecuniary purpose] as the principal purpose with peace of mind as an incidental
motive).
44. Absent contrary factual indications, in car sales and repairs, the most
reasonable finding is that the auto is for personal use, i.e., not for a pecuniary motive
or business purpose. In the sale of a new car, the nonpecuniary interest is founded in
taste and personal preference, and denial of protection for this interest is easily
within the discretion of the court. See Moreau v. Marler Ford Co., 282 So. 2d 852 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1973) (delay in delivery of new truck); Tauzin v. Sam Broussard
Plymouth, Inc., 283 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) (misrepresentation of car as
new in sale).
For the repair of a personal auto, the nonpecuniary interest is founded in
convenience resulting from prior dependence on the auto. See note 29, supra. In
order to balance the interests of the auto mechanic and the consumer, a foreseeability
limitation can be established by separating the obligation to repair the automobile
within a reasonable time from the obligation to properly repair the auto. See also note
35, supra. A breach of the implied obligation to repair the auto within a reasonable
time relates directly to the duty to avoid excessive inconvenience by unreasonable
19771
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is routine in tort law and the courts are more capable of performing this task
than ferreting out illusory psychological distinctions between intellectual
and physical gratification present in contractual objects. 5
Steve M. Marks
THE GAME'S AFOOT: THE STOREKEEPER'S HEIGHTENED RESPONSIBILITY FOR
SLIP AND FALL ACCIDENTS
Since World War Two, the American business community has under-
gone tremendous changes, especially in its retail merchandising system.
The small corner store has given way to national chain stores and self-
service shopping. The local grocery has turned into a giant supermarket. As
always, the law is running hard to keep stride with these changes, trying to
maintain an equilibrium between public policy and private interests. In
order to keep this balance of interests, our courts have had to redesign the
legal relationship between patrons and proprietors. This note examines
recent changes in Louisiana law affecting the responsibility of storekeepers
for slip and fall injuries sustained in their stores.
Louisiana storekeepers owe an affirmative duty to their patrons to use
ordinary or reasonable care' to provide safe aisles and passageways by
means of clean-up and inspection procedures consistent with the purposes of
the store. 2 While this language has been used consistently by the courts to
delay; whereas a breach of the obligation properly to repair the auto is less a
Iproximate" cause of inconvenience where the breach is unintentional. In the instant
case the court noted at the outset that the damages sought were suffered and that the
amount awarded was reasonable, thereby acknowledging the strong tie between the
obligation to repair within a reasonable time and the inconvenience suffered because
of its breach. See the text at note 14, supra.
45. See Ward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 539 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1976)
(certified question to Louisiana Supreme Court concerning the application of the
principle of the instant case to the breach of a contract of insurance).
I. E.g., Calamari v. Winn Dixie La., Inc., 300 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974); Broussard v. National Food Stores, Inc., 233 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1970), aff'd 258 La. 493, 246 So. 2d 838 (1971); Lofton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 208 So.
2d 739 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
2. E.g., Tripkovich v. Winn Dixie La., Inc., 284 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1973), aff'd 286 So. 2d 663 (1973); Fontanille v. Winn Dixie La., Inc., 260 So. 2d 71
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Peters v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 72 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1954).
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